On October 14, 2025, the EU Council will vote on mandatory “chat control” - a system requiring every messaging app to scan private communications for illegal content. No warrant needed. No probable cause required. Continuous, automated scanning of every message you send.
The most troubling part? EU politicians exempted themselves from this surveillance under “professional secrecy” rules. Your representatives literally wrote themselves a get-out-of-surveillance-free card while subjecting 450 million Europeans to algorithmic snooping. If that doesn’t make your blood boil, check your pulse.
Let me break down why client-side scanning (CSS) for CSAM (child sexual abuse material) is technically flawed:
The False Positive Crisis: The Swiss Federal Police report an 80% false positive rate in their current systems. Even if we achieved 99% accuracy (we haven’t), WhatsApp’s 100 billion daily messages would generate 1 billion false positives per day requiring human review.
Hash Collision Vulnerability: The system relies on comparing image hashes to a database. But within 48 hours of Apple announcing NeuralHash, researchers demonstrated collision attacks. A December 2024 study (arXiv:2412.06056) successfully reversed hash functions including PhotoDNA using consumer hardware. Anyone with basic technical knowledge can modify images to bypass detection with imperceptible changes. You’re not catching pedophiles; you’re catching technologically illiterate people.
Expert Consensus: Matthew Green, Johns Hopkins cryptographer, called this “the most alarming proposal I’ve ever read.” The Internet Architecture Board formally opposes CSS as enabling mass surveillance. When 14 of the world’s leading cryptographers and hundreds of scientists and researchers unite in opposition we should pay attention.
Look, I get it. Politicians need to be seen “doing something” about child abuse. But this ain’t it. This is building the infrastructure for something much darker.
China’s Green Dam was sold as a porn filter in 2009. Guess what it actually searched for? Political keywords like “Falun Gong.” The technical architecture you build for scanning CSAM is identical to the architecture for scanning:
Soon you could not install Linux on computers because only approved operating systems would be allowed to connect to the internet.
Think that’s paranoid? The EU is already discussing hardware-level attestation requirements.
Signal has explicitly threatened to withdraw from the EU market rather than implement these backdoors, with CEO Meredith Whittaker stating there’s “no way to implement such proposals without fundamentally undermining encryption.” Similar threats were made regarding France’s anti-encryption law in March 2025.
But most users will simply migrate to whatever compliant app remains available. Network effects are a bitch.
The average European will trade their privacy for the convenience of not switching apps. They’ll tell themselves it’s fine and hit the “nothing to hide” logical fallacy.
Saying you don’t care about privacy because you have nothing to hide is like saying you don’t care about free speech because you have nothing to say. - Snowden
Want to actually protect children? Here’s a radical idea: fund law enforcement to investigate actual crimes with actual warrants.
Consider these facts:
Germany’s position is still undecided and could block this nightmare. If you’re German, this is your moment. Call your representatives. Make noise. Be annoying. Channel your inner bureaucratic perfectionism and demand they read the technical analyses showing this is impossible to implement securely.
For everyone else: visit fightchatcontrol.eu. Contact your representatives. Share this with people who think “encryption” is just for criminals and nerds. Explain that this affects their embarrassing family WhatsApp groups and Tinder messages.
Here’s my prediction: This passes in October. Major platforms leave or comply. Within 18 months, the system expands beyond CSAM to copyright, hate speech, and disinformation. Within 5 years, connecting to the internet requires government-approved hardware running government-approved software.
The infrastructure for Chinese-style internet control gets built in Europe, wrapped in a flag of child protection. Authoritarian governments worldwide cite EU precedent. The open internet becomes a memory that old nerds tell their kids about, like dial-up modems and privacy.
This isn’t about protecting children. It’s about control. It’s about building the technical infrastructure for mass surveillance and hoping nobody notices.
Technology doesn’t lie: you cannot have secure communications with client-side scanning. You cannot have privacy with mandatory backdoors. You cannot have freedom with mass surveillance.
Europeans have a few months to kill this proposal. After that, welcome to the panopticon.
P.S. If you’re an EU politician reading this on your exempted device, enjoying your professional secrecy protection while voting to eliminate mine: history will not be kind to you.